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Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel-
ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s 
mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men-
tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw 
based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states 
and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. The first section of the pa-
per presents Dokic’s argument for the insufficiency of the “ascent routine” to account 
for non-transparent cases of self-ascription, as well as his account of E-feelings. The 
second section then presents a two-level model of metacognition that builds on Dokic’s 
account and my own view of the issue. The two-level model links E-feelings to a min-
dreading capacity in order to account for non-transparent self-ascriptions. Finally, the 
third section develops a deeper characterization of the relation among E-feelings, mental 
action, and self-ascription of mental states based on epistemic rules. In the context of 
self-knowledge, these remarks suggest the existence of means of forming self-ascriptions 
other than the ascent routine.
1. Introduction
Our bodily as well as our mental behavior is caused not only by cognitive 
mental states, such as beliefs and desires, but also by phenomenal experienc-
es, such as emotions and feelings. We often act guided by our feelings, such 
as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; 
but we can also start thinking about our own perceptual states and capaci-
ties based on the same feelings. Mentally acting and/or thinking about one’s 
mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings 
(henceforth E-feelings), but they need not always go together: sometimes, we 
act mentally without thinking about it, and sometimes we think about our 
cognitive processes without acting upon them (see §3).
E-feelings are phenomenal experiences that point towards mental capaci-
ties, processes, and dispositions of the subject, such as knowledge, igno-
rance, or uncertainty (de Sousa, 2008; Dokic 2012; Arango-Muñoz, 2013a). 
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The following are some instances of E-feelings: the feeling of knowing (hence-
forth FOK; reder, 1987, 1996; Koriat 1993, 2000), the feeling of confidence 
(Koriat, 2008; Brewer and Sampaio, 2012), the feeling of error (Arango-Muñoz 
et al. in preparation), the feeling of forgetting (Henceforth FOF; Halamish et 
al. 2011), and the tip-of-the tongue experience (Henceforth TOT; Schwartz, 
2002).1 These feelings tell the subject something about her own mind and mo-
tivate her to perform certain mental actions, such as retrieving information 
from her memory when she has a feeling of knowing, or endorsing retrieved in-
formation when she feels certain about it, but they also motivate self-reflection 
and/or introspective self-ascriptions.
The main aim of this paper will be to clarify the relation between E-feel-
ings, mental actions, and self-ascriptions. The first section presents Dokic’s 
argument for the insufficiency of the “ascent routine” to account for non-trans-
parent cases of self-ascription, and his account of E-feelings. Then, the second 
section presents a two-level model of metacognition that builds on Dokic’s 
account of E-feelings and my own view of the issue. The two-level model of 
metacognition links E-feelings to a mindreading capacity to account for non-
transparent self-ascriptions. Finally, the third section develops a deeper char-
acterization of the relation among E-feelings, mental action, and self-ascription 
of mental states based on epistemic rules. The main idea is to determine how 
epistemic or metacognitive feelings motivate mental action and/or thought 
about one’s own mental states.
2. Dokic on the Ascent Routine and E-Feelings
When it comes to accounting for our capacity to self-ascribe metal states 
and properties, some philosophers seem inclined for versions of the so-called 
“ascent routine” (e.g., gordon 1995, 2007; Moran 2001; Byrne 2005, 2011a, 
2011b, 2011c). The main idea of the ascent routine was originally proposed by 
gareth Evans (1982); according to his account, one can derive a self-ascription 
about an internal mental state from a judgment about the external world: 
“I get myself in position to answer the question whether I believe that p by 
putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question 
whether p” (Evans, 1982: 225). The classic example proposed by Evans con-
cerned the way one finds out whether one believes that there will be a third 
world war; in order to determine this, one only needs to consider the external 
factors that would determine a third world war. richard Moran (2001) synthe-
 1 For a more comprehensive list, see “Epistemic feelings, epistemic emotions: review and intro-
duction to the focus section”, in this issue.
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sizes the idea in the following way: “In ordinary circumstances a claim con-
cerning one’s attitudes counts as a claim about their objects, about the world 
one’s attitudes are directed on” (Moran 2001: 92). In other words, in order to 
determine whether one believes that p one just needs to judge whether p.
In a recent paper, Jérôme Dokic (2012) presents a simple but convincing 
argument demonstrating the insufficiency of the “ascent routine” to account 
for cases of non-transparent self-ascription; i.e., when a subject self-ascribes 
a mental state without having access to its intentional content. This happens 
mainly when the mental state in question is a disposition, a non-occurrent be-
lief, or a mental capacity. Dokic’s strategy is to show that one can only resort 
to the “ascent routine” to obtain a self-ascription from a judgment about the 
external world if one focus on yes-no or polar questions like (Q1) “Is lima the 
capital of peru?” or (Q2) “Do you believe that lima is the capital of peru?”. 
Although Q1 concerns the external world and Q2 concerns an internal belief 
of the addressee, the answer to Q2 can be derived from the answer to Q1. This 
is the core of the ascent routine: one derives a self-ascription from a judgment 
about the world. In contrast, the same does not follow if one focus on non-
polar questions like (Q3) “What’s the capital of peru?” or (Q4) “Do you know 
what the capital of peru is?” where there is not a complete proposition that 
can be judged true or false. As Dokic points out, “the addressee can answer 
Q4 (by saying ‘yes [I know the answer]’) without being in a position to answer 
Q3 (by saying ‘lima’). In fact, she can answer Q4 without having any city in 
mind” (Dokic, 2012: 304; bracketed phrase added). That is, the subject is able 
to answer a question about her mind without being in a position to answer the 
corresponding question about the world. In cases like this, one can answer a 
question about one’s mind without being able to answer a question about the 
external world. In what follows, I will call such cases of self-ascription “non-
transparent”, because the subject is able to self-ascribe a mental state without 
having access to its intentional content, such as when a subject self-ascribes 
the capacity to solve a reasoning problem before solving it, or when she self-
ascribes the capacity to recall some information from her memory before actu-
ally retrieving it:
One can say that success in doing a cognitive task hangs on possessing beliefs or 
pieces of information that are not immediately transparent in the subject’s situation. 
For instance, solving the bat-and-ball puzzle is a cognitive task because it requires that 
one work out the correct answer (even at the implicit level), which is not immediately 
given in the puzzle itself (Dokic, 2012: 316).
So, how does one perform this trick? In other words, how can a subject 
make a self-ascription about her own mental capacities and mental states if 
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she has no access to their intentional content? Dokic’s answer appeals to E-
feelings. One can answer Q4 (without having an answer to Q3) by relying in 
one’s FOK, i.e., the affective experience that points to one’s capacity of answer-
ing the question before one is actually able to do it. The classic example of 
this phenomenon is the TOT. In the TOT state, a subject is confronted with a 
question to which she does not have an immediate answer, although she feels 
that she knows the answer. The subject has not retrieved the answer to the 
question, yet she self-ascribes the proposition “I know the answer” based on 
a metacognitive feeling (Schwartz, 2002; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 2010). Asher 
Koriat presents this case in an insightful way:
Although clearly the TOT represents a state of awareness, the awareness is about 
something that the person does not (yet) know (…). In a sense, the TOT phenomenon 
illustrates a dissociation between subjective and objective indexes of knowing—between 
the subjective conviction that one “knows” the sought-after name, and the actual in-
ability to produce it (Koriat 2000: 151; italics added).
As Koriat remarks, to acknowledge the existence of E-feelings among the 
constituents of the mind stresses the diversity of ways one comes to know 
one’s own mental states. One may realize that one knows the answer to a 
question or the solution to a problem by retrieving it (as happens in the as-
cent routine), but one can also get to know this via a subjective E-feeling. 
The content of one’s mental states can be opaque (as in the TOT case), or it 
can simply be absent (as when one feels that one is forgetting something); in 
these cases it is by the way one feels that one gets to know about it. Moreover, 
the content of a mental state itself does not tell one anything about its cor-
rectness or wrongness. It is by the way one feels about that content that one 
knows how to epistemically stand towards it (Mangan 1993, 2000; see also 
Dokic this volume).
In the same paper, Dokic (2012) proposes an embodied account of E-
feelings that he calls “the water diviner model”. According to his view, these 
feelings are “first and foremost bodily experiences” (Dokic, 2012: 307), i.e., 
experiences about bodily states. They are “diffuse affective states registering 
internal physiological conditions and events”. But in the same way that water 
diviner’s bodily sensations reliably co-vary with physical conditions, namely 
the presence of underground water, E-feelings reliably co-vary with mental 
conditions. For example, the feeling of knowing – which is mainly a bodily 
feeling according to this view – reliably co-varies with the fact that a given 
piece of information can be retrieved from the subject’s memory. This is why, 
according to Dokic, self-ascribing mental states based on such E-feelings leads 
to self-knowledge.
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It is worth highlighting that, although Dokic stresses the fact that E-feel-
ings are “first and foremost bodily experiences”, i.e., they have intrinsic bodily 
content, he also acknowledges that E-feelings have derived intentional content 
that goes beyond the body. He calls his own account of the derived content of 
E-feelings “the competence view”. According to this view, the derived content 
of E-feelings is about one’s own cognitive competence at a given cognitive task 
and has the form “I can [or cannot] do this” (or “this can [or cannot] be done”) 
(Dokic, 2012: 316; bracketed text added), where “this” refers to the cognitive 
task at hand.
Dokic’s criticism of the ascent routine and his account of E-feelings provides 
a novel perspective on the way one comes to know mental capacities, mental 
processes, and dispositions. However, his account falls short when it comes to 
explaining the relation between E-feelings and self-ascriptions. According to 
Dokic’s account, learned heuristics mediate the transition from an E-feeling 
to a self-ascription or second-order judgment so that we are able to “move 
spontaneously from our feelings to judgments concerning the task at hand [… 
and/or], her own mental states” (Dokic, 2012: 308, 309, bracketed text added). 
However, given the paucity of the intentional content of E-feelings (which, on 
Dokic’s view, points only to the competence of the subject), it remains unex-
plained how a subject can derive a self-ascription about a particular mental 
state from a mere feeling. In other words, given that E-feelings are bodily sen-
sations and given that bodily sensations take place at many times and in many 
contexts, there are many possible ways of interpreting those bodily feelings; so 
we need to describe the mental mechanism that does the job and specify more 
fully the “learned heuristics” or the “epistemic rules” (see §3) that it uses to in-
fer a self-ascription from an E-feeling. In a nutshell, there is an explanatory gap 
between the E-feeling one has and the judgment that one forms about one’s 
mind. The following sections will propose a model that aims to close this gap.
3. A Two-Level Model of Non-Transparent Self-Ascriptions
Dokic’s considerations on self-ascription and E-feelings direct our attention 
to an important, yet often neglected, question that any model of self-ascriptions 
and self-knowledge should answer: how can a subject make a non-transparent 
self-ascription about her own mental capacities, mental processes and disposi-
tions based only on a mere E-feeling? As we saw in previous section, this is not 
an easy task. To this end, I will propose a two-level model of metacognition 
(Koriat, 2000; Thompson, 2009; Koriat & Ackerman, 2010; Arango-Munoz, 
2011) that links E-feelings with the mindreading capacity.
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The two-level model of metacognition that I want to defend claims that, in 
cases of non-transparent self-ascriptions, two elements are at play:
low-level Metacognition: E-feelings are elicited by metacog-
nitive monitoring mechanisms according to heuristics and 
the relevant cognitive task.
High-level Metacognition: The mindreading mechanism in-
terprets the E-feelings according to their valence and the 
context, and then produces self-ascriptions of mental states.
The idea of two levels of metacognition is similar to nichols and Stich’s 
model of self-knowledge (2003) which also includes two independent – but 
interactive – mechanisms: a monitoring mechanism and a mindreading mecha-
nism. The main difference between their account and mine concerns the way 
we understand the monitoring mechanism. Whereas, for them, the monitor-
ing mechanism is a subpersonal mechanism (or a set of mental mechanisms) 
that scans mental states in a “Belief Box” and whose main function is to de-
tect mental states and their contents, for me (following the psychological tra-
dition of metacognition research; e.g., reder, 1987, 1996; Koriat 1993, 2000), 
the main function of low-level metacognition is to elicit E-feelings and control 
mental action based on cues and heuristics (see “Epistemic feelings, epistemic 
emotions: review and introduction to the focus section”). In other words, the 
monitoring mechanism does not actually scan mental states.
3.1. low-level Metacognition: E-Feelings as Signals of Absent Objects
The two-level model of metacognition claims that, in cases where the object 
of one’s mental attitude is not transparent, as in answering Q4 by saying ‘yes, I 
know the answer’ when no answer is yet available to the subject, two elements 
are responsible for the formation of self-ascriptions: E-feelings elicited by a 
monitoring mechanism according to certain heuristics (and the cognitive task 
that the subject confronts), and the mindreading mechanism. In this section, I 
will compare Dokic’s view of E-feelings with my own view.
Following Dokic’s account, I understand E-feelings as involving two ingre-
dients: a bodily component, and an intentional content that points towards 
mental conditions (see also goldie, 2002). However, there are two important 
differences between our views. First, according to Dokic, the intentional con-
tent of E-feelings has the form “I can [or cannot] do this” (or “this can [or can-
not] be done”) (Dokic, 2012: 316; bracketed text added). Though I agree with 
the general idea, I consider that it is more accurate to describe their content as 
representing “value by means of positive or negative valence” (Arango-Muñoz, 
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2013a: 4). That is, by feeling a positive or negative affect, the subject becomes 
aware of whether she can or cannot do it, i.e., the implicit metacognitive evalu-
ations of the cognitive task.2 In this respect, Dokic and I both take the content 
of the feeling to refer to the competence of the subject, but it is subjectively 
experienced as a positive or negative affect directed towards a mental state, 
process, or disposition.
The second difference between our views is that I accept – but Dokic does 
not – that E-feelings have richer intentional content; that is, that they can also 
refer to the specific piece of information that the subject is aiming for, though 
this intentional content is non-transparent3 (see also Mangan, 1993, 2000, 2001; 
norman, price and Duff, 2010). For example, in the case of the TOT, the con-
tent is (A) a positive affect that points to the possibility of retrieving whatever 
the subject wants to retrieve (in Dokic terms “I can retrieve it” or “this can be 
retrieved”), and (B) the specific intentional content that the subject is looking 
for. The reason for conceiving the content in this twofold way is that subjects 
are often able to discriminate the target of their feeling among different possi-
ble objects. In many cases (e.g., FOK, TOT, and FOF), the intentional content 
of the feeling (B) is somehow absent – because it has not yet been retrieved, in 
the FOK and TOT, or it has been lost, in the case of FOF. As Koriat remarks, 
E-feelings are often caused by contentless cues and heuristics4 (Koriat 2000), 
but the feelings themselves can also (and often do) condense implicit knowl-
edge or information, as Mangan (1993, 2000, 2001) and norman et al. (2010) 
have proposed.
This becomes even clearer when one consider cases of E-feelings where the 
subject is aware of their intentional content. For example, the feeling of right-
ness, the feeling of certainty, the feeling of uncertainty, and the feeling of error, 
among others, point towards an explicit content (“x is bigger than y”, “lima 
is the capital of peru”, etc.) and evaluate the content as correct or incorrect. 
given these cases, it is clear that the subject feels a positive or negative affect 
towards a given content, not only about her mental competence.
In a nutshell, in my view, E-feelings are implicit assessments of value – posi-
tive or negative – concerning a given cognitive or mental task. They indicate 
 2 This does not mean that she is aware of the metacognitive evaluations as such. She is only aware 
of the positive or negative valence concerning the cognitive task she is confronting.
 3 To say that it is non-transparent is another way of saying that it is unconscious but present. I 
claim that the content is present because subjects’ behavior exhibits intelligence that would not be 
possible without intentional content (see Arango-Muñoz 2013a).
 4 For example, E-feelings are triggered by sensory cues such as the frequency of encounter with 
a stimulus (reder 1996; paynter, reder & Kieffaber 2009), its perceptual fluency (Whittlesea 1993; 
Whittlesea & Williams, 2001), or the fluency of the processing of a stimulus (Koriat 2000).
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or point towards a non-transparent and/or transparent object and, at the same 
time, motivate certain types of bodily and/or mental behavior (Arango-Mu-
ñoz, 2013a, 2013b).
3.2. High-level Metacognition: Mindreading mechanism interprets E-feelings
According to some theorists, the mindreading mechanism is an inferential 
mechanism provided with (A) a theory of mind (TOM) and (B) a set of psy-
chological concepts that, given a behavioral or perceptual input, generates a 
self-ascription as output (carruthers 2009, 2011; gopnik 1993; Wegner 2002; 
Bogdan, 2010; Flavell 2000). On the one hand, (A) the theory of mind can be 
understood as a broad sketch of how the mind works and how it causes behav-
ior. Subjects rely on such a theory to understand others’ behavior. On the other 
hand, (B) psychological concepts are concepts referring to propositional atti-
tudes such as perceptions, feelings, intentions, knowledge, beliefs and expecta-
tions, among others. Subjects use and combine this type of concept to ascribe 
mental states to other people and to themselves. The mindreading mechanism 
has evolved to interpret others’ behaviors, but it can also be turned upon one-
self (carruthers 2009, 2011).5
So, the idea is that in cases of non-transparent self-ascription, the subject 
relies on E-feelings in order to self-ascribe mental properties using her min-
dreading capacity. The reason why the subject has to resort to her mindread-
ing capacity is that, in non-transparent cases of self-ascription (e.g., when the 
mental state in question is a disposition, a non-occurrent belief or emotion, or 
a mental capacity), she is in a epistemic position with respect to her own mind 
similar to the position that she is in when she evaluates and interprets others’ 
minds. That is, she only has access to cues and indirect evidence about her own 
mental states. In these cases, the content is opaque or absent, and therefore she 
self-ascribes a mental state based only on her E-feelings without having any 
access to the intentional content of the ascribed mental state.
Thus, in non-transparent self-ascription, the mindreading capacity takes as 
input the E-feeling elicited by low-level metacognitive monitoring, contextual 
factors and knowledge (such as the kind of cognitive task the subject is con-
fronting and the kind of possible mental states related to that task), and then 
generates a positive or negative self-ascription according to the valence of the 
feeling. A positive E-feeling motivates a positive self-ascription concerning a 
 5 I do not want to commit myself to the claim that subjects only understand others’ minds by 
means of a theory. There may be cases where they resort to mental simulations. However, it seems 
unlikely that they use mental simulations to understand and get self-knowledge of their own mind, as 
is acknowledged even by simulation theorists (e.g., goldman 2006). 
 METAcOgnITIvE FEElIngS, SElF-AScrIpTIOnS AnD MEnTAl AcTIOnS 153
mental capacity, whereas a negative E-feeling motivates a negative self-ascrip-
tion. So, if a subject is confronted with a question to which she does not have 
an immediate answer, she may rely on her intuitive E-feeling to generate a self-
ascription concerning her knowledge or ignorance of the answer (see Figure 
1). For instance, if a subject had a negative feeling when confronted with a 
memory task, the mindreading mechanism might self-ascribe the concept of 
uncertainty or forgetting (see below §3).
In this way, the puzzle of how a subject self-ascribes a non-transparent men-
tal property, one to which she does not have yet conscious access, is solved.
4. E-Feelings, Mental Action and Self-Ascriptions
The previous considerations broadly describe how the mindreading mecha-
nism forms non-transparent self-ascriptions based on E-feelings. However, de-
scribing the mechanism is not sufficient; one should also describe the “learned 
heuristics” (as Dokic [2012] called them) or “epistemic rules” (as I call them, 
following Byrne [2005, 2011a]) that govern the functioning of the mindreading 
mechanism.6 This section will provide a deeper characterization of the relation 
among E-feelings, mental action and self-ascriptions of mental states based on 
epistemic rules.
4.1. rule-following considerations
Some philosophers have found appealing the idea that rule-following con-
siderations can explain the formation of self-ascriptions (Byrne, 2005, 2011a, 
2011b, 2011c; peacocke, 2008: 206; goldie 2002). According to this strategy, a 
subject follows a more or less implicit rule of the sort “if p, then believe that 
you believe p” (Byrne, 2005, 2011) whenever she makes a self-ascription of a 
mental state. Although I broadly follow Byrne’s idea of epistemic rules for self-
ascriptions, the rules that I posit here are quite different in character: they are 
neither transparent nor neutral, in contrast to the rules proposed by him (see 
§3.3). Moreover, in my view they are not only for reasoning about one’s own 
mental states, but also for directing mental action.
In the following, I will talk as if subject followed rules for self-ascribing 
mental states, but this should be taken just as an approximate metaphor that 
 6 Although I’m adopting Byrne’s concept, there are important difference between his view and 
my own view. The main disagreement is that he claims that epistemic rules are applied and followed 
by subjects themselves, whereas I claim that they are applied or followed by the mindreading mecha-
nism – something Byrne wouldn’t accept. But this disagreement is not really relevant here, since we 
are trying to explain different kinds of self-ascription. 
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describes the cognitive processes that guide subjects’ behavior and self-ascrip-
tions. In other words, even if the subject does not actually follow a rule (after 
all, she does not have a clear understanding of the rule, and she is not even 
able to articulate it), her behavior can be characterized as embodying or dis-
playing some epistemic rules or heuristics. That is, although these rules and 
heuristics can be inferred by observing subjects’ behavior and are useful for 
predicting it, more research is needed before we can commit to their actual 
existence.
To begin with, let us assume that a subject employs two different epis-
temic rules when confronted with E-feelings; she does not need to employ 
both rules on every occasion. A rule can be understood as a reference that 
one (or the cognitive system – the mindreading mechanism in this particular 
case) invokes each time that one needs to determine something. In simpler 
terms, when confronted with an E-feeling, a subject needs to know what to 
do, and epistemic rules tell her roughly what to do; as we will see, two rules 
are the links among E-feelings, mental action and self-ascriptions. On the 
one hand, epistemic rules for action (r1) are those one invokes for determin-
ing which mental action to perform given an E-feeling. On the other hand, 
epistemic rules for self-ascription (r2) are those we invoke for determining 
what to believe about one’s self, one’s mental states, and one’s dispositions 
given an E-feeling.
let me briefly introduce both rules. The next three sections will analyze 
and explain them in detail.
Epistemic rule for mental action (r1): If E-feeling Y arises, 
then do mental action X.
 Example: If FOK, then “try to remember”.
Epistemic rule for self-ascriptions (r2): If E-feeling Y arises, 
then you are entitled to form a second-order belief about 
your mental activities, dispositions or capacities according 
to the valence of your E-feeling: a positive judgment if a 
positive E-feeling and vice versa.
 Example: If FOK, then form the belief “I can remember”.
4.2. Epistemic rule for mental action (r1)
At first glance, r1 seems to be a practical rather than an epistemic rule since 
the term “epistemic” is often exclusively associated with belief formation, as in 
r2. r1 is about what to do instead of what to believe. However, r1 should be 
considered epistemic since any mental action, which can be roughly defined 
as a directed change in the mind (see proust 2001, 2009a), necessarily entails 
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epistemic changes, e.g., perceptual or informational improvements and/or re-
lapses.
Some theorists may criticize this account by suggesting that the action in 
the former clause implies the second-order belief suggested by the latter: “to 
do X mental action” or “to try to remember” implies the second-order belief 
that “you believe that you can do X (or remember)”, since you cannot try to 
remember without believing that you can do it. But, as I will show, r1 does not 
imply r2, and applying r1 does not require applying r2 (see §3.4). The first 
argument for the dissociation between r1 and r2 is the phenomenological 
observation that prima facie one performs many mental actions such as remem-
bering, calculating, or reasoning just by attending to those actions, and with-
out any need to make second order judgments about one’s self (vierkant, 2012; 
proust, 2007, 2012). Furthermore, the fact that some non-human animals and 
infants may grasp r1 but do not reach r2 also supports the distinction. These 
agents are able to engage in information-acquiring acts although they are un-
able to form metarepresentations, stricto sensu (carruthers 2008, 2009, 2011; 
Bermúdez 2009), i.e., second-order thoughts that involves the deployment of 
psychological concepts and a self-concept. For example, rhesus monkey and 
young children are able to monitor and control their cognitive performance 
in memory and perception tasks, allowing them to attain an accurate perfor-
mance similar to human behavior in perception and memory (Hampton 2001; 
Balcomb & gerken 2008; see Smith 2009 for a review). A plausible explanation 
of their ability to monitor and control their mental capacities without resorting 
to metarepresentation is that their behavior is guided by metacognitive feel-
ings (proust 2009b; Arango-Muñoz, 2011; Dokic, 2012). Thus, r1 concerns the 
relationship between E-feelings and mental action, and can be possessed and 
applied even by beings lacking the possibility of forming second-order beliefs 
about themselves, i.e., introspective self-ascriptions.
Thus, according to r1, E-feelings can motivate and guide action directly 
(i.e., without passing through the reflective process of self-ascription), and the 
subject can cite them to account for a given action: “I have done X because I 
had Y feeling”. Similarly, we can cite these kinds of mental states to interpret 
the behavior of others: “The subject acted in a given way because she had that 
E-feeling”.
4.3. Epistemic rule for self-ascriptions (r2)
r2 determines the relation between feelings and introspective self-as-
criptions or second-order beliefs; in particular, it determines when to form 
a second-order belief about oneself. In other words, it dictates the formation 
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of self-ascriptions based on E-feelings. Based on the particular experience of 
easiness or difficulty of carrying out a cognitive task, the subject constructs 
a semantically articulated self-ascription that involves the deployment of psy-
chological concepts (KnOWIng, InTEnDIng, etc.) and the concept of 
the self. Thus, an E-feeling gives prima facie reason to a subject to form the 
self-ascription that she has or lacks a piece of information (peacocke, 2008; 
proust 2009a).
notice that, in contrast to ascent routine (discussed in §1), the content self-
ascribed by following r2 is not already present in the antecedent part of the 
conditional rule, i.e., it is not transparent. The conditional rule used in the 
ascent routine says “If p, believe that you believe p” (Byrne 2005, 2011a). So, 
the self-ascribed content is typically already present in the reasoning process; 
this is why it can be considered to be a transparent procedure. r2, in contrast, 
Figure 1: Schema of the two-level model of metacognition. Each time a subject is confronted with a 
cognitive problem, low-level Metacognition evaluates it based on some heuristics and elicits positive 
or negative E-feelings (see 2.1). There are two possible outcomes of E-feelings: Mentally acting (object 
level – below horizontal line) and thinking about one’s mental states (meta-level – above horizontal 
line). The dotted line pointing downwards depicts the way E-feelings directly modulate mental ac-
tions (see §3.2); this can happen following r1, which is an epistemic rule for mental action. The dotted 
line pointing upwards depicts the way E-feelings influence high-level metacognition (see §3.3): self-
ascriptions based on E-feelings are produced by high-level metacognition following r2, which is an 
epistemic rule for self-ascription.
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derives the content of the self-ascription from the valence of the E-feeling, the 
context, and related information about the task. Thus, the procedure of form-
ing self-ascriptions based on r2 has the advantage of providing the subject 
with new information that was not already contained in subject’s representa-
tional state, as in the ascent routine.
Another feature of r2 is that it is not “neutral”, as are the rules proposed 
by Byrne (2005, 2011a). According to Byrne’s (2005, 2011a) account of self-
knowledge, an epistemic rule is neutral if “the antecedent condition c of an 
epistemic rule r is not specified in terms of the rule follower’s mental states” 
(Byrne 2005: 94; 2011a). In contrast, according to r2, the antecedent part of 
the conditional is specified in terms of rule follower’s mental states, mainly 
by E-feelings and beliefs about the context and the task.7 Because of these 
features, r2 has a “relative disadvantage” with respect to Byrne’s model of 
self-ascriptions: self-ascriptions following r2 are not self-verifying, in contrast 
to those provided by Byrne’s version of the ascent routine. Because of the in-
terpretative character of r2, it leaves open the possibility of misattribution 
and introspective error. This would be a disadvantage if one wanted to hold 
that introspection is infallible. But, in my view, this feature of r2 is in fact an 
advantage because it helps to explain misattribution of mental states and con-
fabulations, two common phenomena in introspective reports (see carruthers, 
2009, 2011).
4.4. Differences between r1 and r2
A key difference between the two kinds of epistemic rules is the way we 
determine their quality: r1 is a good rule if it leads to successful mental ac-
tions, whereas r2 is a good rule if it leads to the formation of reliable beliefs 
about one’s own mental dispositions. Moreover, the first is an imperative to act 
mentally, to do something, whereas the second is merely a suggestion to form 
a second-order belief, which can be dissociated from action. Thus, r2 permits 
a reflective distance that is not allowed by r1; the subject can contemplate the 
content of her self-ascription without engaging in action. This suggests that the 
content of r1 is imperative, whereas the content of r2 is merely descriptive or 
propositional (see Boghossian, 2008).
What counts as possession and application of r1 is successfully dealing with 
mental uncertainty, that is, the ability to accurately predict and retrospectively 
 7 Dokic proposes (personal communication) that we could preserve the neutrality of rules by 
granting that E-feelings are mainly bodily experiences: “If I am in bodily state B, then believe that…”. 
Although I agree that E-feelings have a bodily component, I don’t accept the identification of the 
former with the latter; E-feelings have properties that bodily experiences lack.
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correct cognitive outputs. This is a recurrent activity that involves a subject’s 
sensitivity to her mental activity and her capacity to control it: an ability to ex-
ploit E-feelings (also called “mental affordances” by proust 2009b, 2007). In 
contrast, what counts as the possession and application of r2 is the explicit 
formation of conceptual self-ascriptions that may be true or false. This is an 
occasional act of intellect and conceptual understanding that may facilitate 
the correction of behavior in terms of social rules or theories of how the 
mind works. A subject would not be able to check whether she is mentally 
acting according to a given social rule unless she is able to make a self-ascrip-
tion that allows her to contrast what she is doing with what the rule suggests 
(Flavell, 1998).
E-feelings need not cause both action and second-order belief every time 
they occur. The subject may act without forming the second-order belief, and 
she may form a second-order belief without acting. The first case is illustrated 
by our daily behavior: we perform many mental actions, we remember, calcu-
late, reason, and we execute all of these actions in a very precise and controlled 
way guided by E-feelings without making second-order judgments about each 
action (vierkant, 2012; proust, 2007, 2012; Arango-Muñoz, 2013a). That may 
be one of the reasons why we are often unaware of how we carry out all the 
mental processes we routinely carry out. The second case is illustrated by cases 
in which an E-feeling motivates a second-order belief but we fail to act on it. A 
FOF makes a subject believe that she is forgetting something, but the subject, 
due to hurry, stress, or simply neglect, may be unable to do anything about it: 
she fails to check what she is forgetting.
5. Concluding remarks
As I said at the outset, we often mentally act guided by our E-feelings, such as 
when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but we 
can also start thinking about our own perceptual states and capacities based on 
the same E-feeling. E-feelings are phenomenal experiences that point towards 
mental capacities, processes and dispositions of the subject such as knowledge, 
ignorance, or uncertainty. The main aim of this paper was to clarify the relation 
between E-feelings, mental actions and self-ascriptions. As I have shown, men-
tally acting and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes 
of E-feelings, but they need not always go together: sometimes we mentally act 
without thinking about, and sometimes we think about our cognitive processes 
without acting upon them. The take-home idea, then, is that, in non-transparent 
cases, E-feelings guide mental action and/or self-ascriptions. In the context of 
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self-knowledge, these remarks suggest the existence of other means, different 
form the ascent routine, of forming self-ascriptions.
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